AI's Big, Money's Bigger      Publish Date : 20/11/2026

            AI's Big, Money's Bigger

                                                                     Professor R. S. Sengar and Er. Kartikeya Singh

When bond yields surged in recent months, analysts and top US officials simply shrugged, saying the AI boom would thrive regardless. This is classic bubble logic. Price of money always matters. There's good reason to believe that is true, now more than ever.

Global debt is at record levels, much of it accumulating on govt books. This is good news short-term (govts are typically the last fortress to fall), but bad news in the end (govts will be in no position to deliver stimulus or bailouts). Pool of available capital is more limited than it was in the booms of late 1990s and 2000s, because, this time, firms must compete with govts for money.

That sets the stage for a rapid liquidity squeeze. Higher rates threaten to trap corporations, between steeper borrowing costs, and increasingly wary lenders. As big tech firms turn from cash to debt, to fund their multi-trillion-dollar data centre buildout, new AI-related debt issues are likely to exceed $600bn in 2026, up tenfold from 2024.

                               

While interest rates were arguably at similar levels, in 1990s' boom, the story arc was very different. Rates, today, aren't just high, they've risen rapidly in a short period, after nearly 25 years of historically low rates that trained investors to expect endlessly easy money. A regime change like this one is bound to cause financial stress. Already cracks are appearing, as investors demand much higher yields to finance the weakest borrowers in the AI supply chain.

Most observers, nonetheless, find ways to take comfort amid these tremors. US stock market looks resilient; default rates remain low. Plenty of credit is still available to fund the frantic AI buildout. But the end of a boom is a process, not a point in time. It takes a while for higher rates to have a systemic impact.

Consider the sequence of events in busts of 2000 and 2008. High rates did eventually deflate those bubbles, affecting the weakest sectors before reaching the broader market and economy. This process unfolded over several years. Tech stocks took a big step down early 2000, but many investors were still piling into tech funds late that year; the bubbly enthusiasm didn't die out until 2001.

Magical thinking flourishes in a bubble's final stages. One central myth of dotcom era was that "enormous" demand for internet products freed tech firms from ordinary economic forces, such as interest rates. Before 2008, analysts tried to make the case that "rising rates don't burst bubbles", or would merely slow, not reverse, gains in home and share prices, or would not touch stocks at all because corporate profits were "the best in 80 years".

                               

Eerily similar claims can be heard today for AI. Optimists argue a few percentage points of interest won't mean much to firms facing historic gains in value. Or that Fed rate hikes measured in mere basis points, will not lower spending ambitions of companies trying to win AI arms race. Now that higher rates are hitting AI subsectors, including speciality suppliers of computing power, known as neoclouds, they brush off the notion that a few tens of billions in debt, could take the AI complex down.

It would be a wonder if these dismissals proved correct, since every major boom of the last three centuries has ended amid tightening financial conditions. Even before the arrival of modern central banks, manias ran out of steam when private financiers pulled the plug on funding for the hot new tech of the day, including railroads in 19th century. Financial contagions can spring from obscure corners of the market; 2008's global crisis started in US subprime mortgage debt.

Finding scenarios that would reverse this process of erosion caused by higher rates requires more magical thinking. The main one is that AI will generate a boost to productivity growth so big, and so fast, all risks dissolve in its path. The economy takes off. As a result, debt to GDP declines, interest rates come down, and all the trillions companies are spending on AI pay off in massive revenues, which solve the funding problem.

These blue-sky projections overlook a new vulnerability: Unlike past booms, including late 1980s one, money pouring into tech is not lifting other sectors: outside AI, borrowing is weak, investment is falling. It is difficult to see how AI firms can thrive when so many of their potential customers are struggling.

Consequences of an unravelling will ripple out of US to rest of the world, since global economy and global market returns are now driven, almost entirely, by money pouring into big AI firms and their suppliers. Nations like India, largely bypassed by AI boom, won't be on the frontline of any sell-off, but may entirely escape the fallout if a crash happens.

The mania for AI stocks has frayed in recent months as higher rates have begun to strain credit marks. Investors have become more discerning in how they allocate money; and their concerns will be amplified anew, if US interest rates resume their climb, which is likely given the ever-rising credit needs of govt and AI firms. This may be the most transformative tech boom yet, but it's not big enough to defy the high price of money.

Writer: Professor R. S. Sengar, Dean College of Biotechnology and Director Training and Placement, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel University of Agriculture and Technology, Modipuram, Meerut.