Eight Crucial States, Three Bad Actors

                                                                                                                                               Professor R. S. Sengar

GOI's tough response after Dhaka's provocative rhetoric on Northeast must also factor in bigger worries: Beijing and Islamabad are looking to exploit any Indian vulnerability around the Siliguri Corridor.

Speaking at the recent Rising North east Investor Summit, PM Modi pitched the region as a vibrant growth hub. PM's statement came days after India's decision to stop import of significant goods from Bangladesh through land ports. This week, Jyotiraditya Scimdin followed suit by pitching Northeast's eight states as geostrategic assets. All of this is clearly designed to respond to Bangladesh's interim chief adviser Muhammad Yunus's rhetoric on Northeast. But the far bigger worry is China, and its faithful follower, Pakistan. Here's a lowdown.

What is India's latest import ban? India has restricted the import of at least seven categories of Bangladeshi goods, including readymade garments (Bangladesh's biggest export), fruits and processed foods through its land ports. However, some exemptions have been given for example fish, editile oil, LPG and crushed stone can still enter through these land ports. Meanwhile, Bangladeshi garments can continue to enter through Kolkata and NhavaSheva (Mumbai) seaports. This will considerably add to costs for Bangladeshi manufacturers and producers, increase delays in deliveries, and particularly hit small businesses.

What is New Delhi's justification? It has cited protection of local industries in the Northeast states as the reason for the restrictions. It also hasn't gone unnoticed that the restrictions came after Dhaka banned the import of yarn from India through land ports. However, the tit-for-tat non-tariff barriers to bilateral trade risk cutting the economic sinews that bound the two countries during the previous Sheikh Hasina dispensation in Dhaka.

Therefore, New Delhi is playing a delicate game with the Bangladeshi interim govt. It is trying to put pressure to make Dhaka realise the benefits of cordial economic ties. But too much pressure would be counterproductive.

What are the strategic ramifications? There is unease in New Delhi about Dhaka's recent outreach to China and Pakistan. Yunus has openly asked for Chinese investments in Bangladesh and the region implying India's Northeast. Meanwhile, there are several reports on how Dhaka is slowly ramping up strategic security collaboration with Islamabad.

In Feb, Bangladeshi navy took part in exercises along with its Pak counterpart. This is essentially a repudiation of the Hasina years when diplomatic ties between Bangladesh and Pakistan had been downgraded. And in the wake of Operation Sindoor, Pakistan most likely is looking at putting pressure on India's eastern flank via Bangladesh. Cutting off India's Northeast would certainly be part of plans for the ISI-military complex.

How big is the China factor? | Huge. Under Hasina

Chinese investments in Bangladesh had been tempered. But now they are pretty much free flowing Chinese factories and industrial townships are coming up in Bangladesh that are mostly peopled by Chinese workers. Bangladesh can be China's fountainhead of anti-India pressure in the Northeast. After all, Beijing has continued to refer to Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet and rename places there to reflect Chinese claims.

Plus, after Operatio Sindoor where China massively helped Pakistan, Beijing would be looking to deal New Delhi some strategic blows to impede India's risc. With an obliging dispensation in Bangladesh, Pakistan looking for post-Sindoor revenge, and China looking to keep India quiet, the Northeast is emerging as the new strategic security battleground.

Is pressure building up on Siliguri Corridor again? Yes. In 2017, China had clearly set its strategic sights on the Siliguri Corridor connecting India's Northeast during the Doklam standoff. This time reports are emerging that it may be looking to revive Bangla desh's British-era Lalmonirhat airport in Rangpur Division very close to the Corridor Some Chinese officials recently visited the airbase. Before that, even some Pak military and intelligence officials had visited the Indo-Bangla border areas.

In Feb, Bangladesh had unveiled a plan to revive six British era airbases, including Lalmonirhat. While it is still not clear if the Lalmonirhat airbase will be revamped with Chinese money-Dhaka had secured 82.1bn in investments, loans and grants from Beijing in March any Chinese involvement here will raise concerns in India. Beijing could redevelop the Lalmonirhat airport into a dual-use civil military asset and use it for spying into India.

Second, Rangpur and its nearby areas have long been the bastion of Jatiya Party in Bangladeshi politics. Jatiya Party cooperated with the Hasina govt at various points. But there are now reports that elements of the new dispensation in Dhaka, including Jamaat-e-Islami, are trying to usurp the Jatiya Party's influence in Rangpur region. With Jamaat having a track record of anti-India activities, it could settle the border areas in Rangpur Division with radicals and extremists.

This again puts pressure on the Siliguri Corridor and the Northeast. India, therefore, must be proactive in tackling this strategic-security challenge that has coalesced around an unfriendly China-Pakistan-Bangladesh triumvirate.

Writer: Professor R. S. Sengar, Director Training and Placement, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel University of Agriculture and Technology, Modipuram, Meerut.